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NOTES
ROSS V. OKLAHOMA: A REVERSAL OF THE
REVERSIBLE-ERROR STANDARD IN
DEATH-QUALIFICATION CASES
During the past twenty years, courts have grappled with the issue of
whether prospective jurors should be excluded from service on juries in capi-
tal cases because of their personal views on the death penalty. These cases
have arisen both where defense counsel sought to strike potential jurors who
indicated that they would automatically vote to impose the death penalty if
the defendant were convicted,' and more commonly, where prosecutors have
attempted to eliminate venirepersons who stated that their reservations
about the death penalty could affect their decision either on the question of
guilt or at the sentencing phase.2
Defendants facing the death penalty have advanced several different argu-
ments in seeking reversal of their convictions.3 The claims have been
couched most often in either sixth amendment or fourteenth amendment
terms. The appeals alleging sixth amendment violations usually involve
claims of judicial error in either the grant or refusal of a challenge for cause
or the prosecution's improper use of peremptory challenges.4 Those charg-
ing fourteenth amendment violations claim that the court denied the defend-
ant his due process or equal protection rights under the law.5 State courts
and federal circuit courts have adopted widely inconsistent positions on
1. See, e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 2276 (1988).
2. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 512-13 (1968).
3. See id. at 516-17 (arguing that death-qualified juries are conviction-prone); Keeten v.
Garrison, 742 F.2d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 1984) (arguing that death-qualified juries deprive defend-
ants of a jury composed of a fair cross-section of the community), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153
(1986); Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 583 (5th Cir. 1981) (arguing that death-qualified
juries have detrimental effects on defendants' constitutional rights), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882
(1982); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1978) (also advancing the
fair cross-section argument), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979); United States ex rel. Clark v.
Fike, 538 F.2d 750, 761 (7th Cir. 1976) (also advancing the conviction-prone argument), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977).
4. See, e.g., Ross, 108 S. Ct. 2273; Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987); Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S.
122 (1976); Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510.
5. See, e.g., Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2275; Gray, 481 U.S. at 657; Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 165 (1986); Adams, 448 U.S. at 40-41 (1980); Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 518. All of
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these issues.6
The United States Supreme Court has also considered numerous jury se-
lection cases.7 The Court has attempted to identify acceptable procedures
for selecting a jury. The standards for challenges for cause and the appropri-
ate use of peremptory challenges have evolved from the progression in the
Court's decisions. However, the type of error in jury selection that mandates
the reversal of a conviction remains unclear.' The two most recent Supreme
Court rulings relating to errors in the jury selection process have enunciated
completely different tests for determining whether convictions in capital
cases must be reversed.
In its 1987 decision in Gray v. Mississippi,9 the Court declared that the
improper exclusion of a juror for cause constituted reversible constitutional
error which could not be submitted to mere harmless error review. 10 David
Randolph Gray was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to death for a
stabbing committed during a kidnapping." During the jury selection pro-
cess, the trial judge erroneously excused a juror for cause.12 When consider-
ing Gray's challenge to the composition of the jury, the Supreme Court
identified the proper inquiry as whether the judge's error could have affected
the composition of the jury as a whole. 3
While the Supreme Court had apparently established a clear view of the
appropriate test in Gray, it almost immediately changed course with its opin-
ion in Ross v. Oklahoma. 14 Bobby Lynn Ross had also been sentenced to
death for murder.'" Defense counsel had been forced to exercise, a peremp-
tory challenge to correct the trial judge's error in failing to excuse a juror for
cause.' 6 In Ross, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated for the majority that the
language in Gray was not meant to be applied literally,' 7 and held instead
that any claim that a jury was not impartial must focus not on the juror who
these cases also include sixth amendment claims, so the sixth and fourteenth amendment
claims will generally be discussed together infra.
6. See infra notes 67-102 and accompanying text.
7. See cases cited supra notes 4-5; see also Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
8. See infra notes 151-203 and accompanying text.
9. 481 U.S. 648.
10. Id. at 660-61.
11. Id. at 651, 656.
12. Id. at 658-59.
13. Id. at 665 (quoting Moore v. Estelle, 670 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1111 (1982)). The Court framed the test as "whether the composition of the jury panel as a
whole could possibly have been affected by the trial court's error." Id.
14. 108 S. Ct. 2273 (1988).
15. Id. at 2276.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2278.
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was excused, but rather on the jurors who ultimately sat.'8 In affirming
Ross' conviction and death sentence,' 9 the Court completely side-stepped
the critical inquiry identified in Gray: whether the jury composition as a
whole had been affected.
This Note first presents the history and development of both challenges
for cause and peremptory challenges. It then focuses on court cases that
have considered the exclusion of jurors based on their attitudes toward the
death penalty, and examines the divergent standards for reversal which
those courts adopted. Next, this Note compares and contrasts the United
States Supreme Court decisions in Gray and Ross and addresses how well
they maintain the availability of both types of challenges. Finally, this Note
concludes that although the Ross decision is not completely without founda-
tion, the Gray decision is more faithful to the tradition of providing peremp-
tory challenges to the accused and affords better protection of the
constitutional rights of defendants in capital cases.
I. HISTORY OF CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE AND
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees all
criminal defendants the right to a trial by an impartial jury.2" The tools of
challenges for cause and peremptory challenges were developed to help se-
cure that impartial jury.21
A. Challenges for Cause
Challenges for cause originated in the English common law and were later
adopted in the United States.2" Counsel for either side generally asks the
court to excuse a juror for cause if that juror's responses to voir dire ques-
tioning indicate that he cannot be impartial.23 Challenges for cause permit
the rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable, and legally cogniza-
ble basis of partiality.24 Their use will theoretically eliminate the most obvi-
18. Id. at 2277.
19. Id. at 2275, 2280.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21. J. M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 139-41 (1977).
22. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 213 (1969) (see also J. PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY
JURY §§ 166-198 (1877); M. LESSER, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM
(1894) (cited therein)). In 1305, the Ordinance for Inquests provided that when any represen-
tative of the King wanted to challenge a juror, a cause certain had to be assigned. 33 Edw. 1,
Stat. 4 (1305), (cited in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 213 (1965)).
23. Project: Criminal Procedure, 74 GEO. L.J. 751, 788 (1986) [hereinafter Project]; 47
AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 213 (1969).
24. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
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ously biased venirepersons: those who would fall at the far ends of the
spectrum in the search for impartiality. They may also be used to eliminate
prospective jurors based on a perceived lack of competency to serve. 25 Chal-
lenges for cause may be unlimited in number but they must always be ex-
plained. 26 The trial court is afforded broad discretion in deciding whether to
excuse jurors for cause. Therefore, the denial of such challenges has rarely
been the basis for reversal.27
B. Peremptory Challenges
Peremptory challenges differ from challenges for cause in that they need
not be based on articulable reasons, but are purely discretionary.28 Lawyers
may use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors perceived as biased for rea-
sons that cannot be as clearly identified.29 Peremptory challenges permit a
lawyer to play his hunches by striking potential jurors who could not be
excluded for cause.3° The major difference between the two types of chal-
lenges involves the degree of partiality needed to justify their use. Chal-
lenges for cause must be explained to the trial judge's satisfaction.31
Peremptory challenges by their nature may be used in an arbitrary and ca-
pricious manner, and are meant to be exercised without control.32
Like challenges for cause, peremptory challenges also have a long-stand-
ing history in the American judicial system, 33 even though they, are not man-
dated by the Constitution. 34 The Supreme Court has recognized that the
right to challenge jurors historically is based on the common law along with
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1982) (competency standards); see also Blume, Jury Selection
Analyzed, 42 MICH. L. REV. 831 (1944).
26. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 127 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Some possible
bases for challenges for cause may include "having served on the grand jury that indicted the
defendant, being related to a party [to the litigation], or having a state of mind that would
prevent the venireperson from being impartial." Comment, Wainwright v. Witt and Death-
Qualified Juries: A Changed Standard But an Unchanged Result, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1187, 1187
(1986); Note, Survey of the Law of Peremptory Challenges. Uncertainty in the Criminal Law, 44
U. Pirr. L. REV. 673, 676 n.22 (1983) [hereinafter Survey].
27. Project, supra note 23, at 788-89.
28. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
29. Id.
30. Survey, supra note 26, at 676 (citing Younger, Unlawful Peremptory Challenges, 7
LITIGATION 23 (1980)).
31. See Project, supra note 23, at 788-89. It has even been suggested that the judge should
excuse jurors for cause, and counsel should only have to request a challenge for cause if the
judge does not excuse the juror on his own. 3 A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
standard 15-2.5 (2d ed. 1980).
32. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219-20.
33. Survey, supra note 26, at 674-75. The development of the use of peremptory chal-
lenges in the United States clearly paralleled that of the English common law. Id. at 675.
34. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
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the right to trial by jury, and has always been considered essential to the
fairness of jury trials.35
The right to peremptory challenges is not solely a judicial creation; it has
received broad legislative support as well. The First Congress recognized
the criminal defendants' common law privilege of peremptory challenges.36
In 1865, Congress extended the right to use peremptory challenges to prose-
cutors in federal courts.37 Modern Congresses have demonstrated a com-
mitment to maintaining the availability of peremptory challenges by
providing for them in both civil and criminal federal cases.38 State legisla-
tures have also acknowledged the need for peremptory challenges. By about
1900, many state legislatures had firmly established the government's right
to exercise peremptory challenges by enacting statutes authorizing their use
by both the prosecutor and the defendant.39 Today, the peremptory chal-
lenge is a statutory tool that supplements the challenge for cause.4 ° It helps
satisfy both litigants as to the composition of the jury because they have an
active role in shaping it themselves.4
The rationale behind the development of both types of challenges and the
appropriate circumstances for their use has become particularly important in
death penalty cases. The role of challenges for cause and peremptory chal-
lenges in jury selection in capital cases has generated considerable Supreme
Court action with no definite resolution.
II. EARLY "DEATH-QUALIFICATION" CASES
A. The Early Years
The practice of identifying and excluding prospective jurors whose views
on the death penalty would prohibit them from fulfilling their duty in a capi-
tal case is generally known as "death-qualification." 42 Death-qualification of
35. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S.
370, 376 (1892); accord Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
36. Survey, supra note 26, at 675.
37. Id. (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 2, 13 Stat. 500) (current version at FED. R.
CRIM. P. 24(b)).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1982) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). See also H.R. REP. No.
1076, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 5-6, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1792,
1795.
39. Survey, supra note 26, at 675.
40. See generally id. at 675-76.
41. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 552-53
(1975).
42. Gross, Determining the Neutrality of Death-Qualified Juries: Judicial Appraisal of
Empirical Data, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 7, 7 (1984). The term "death-qualified" has been
used to describe juries selected by several different processes. See, e.g., Schnapper, Taking
Witherspoon Seriously. The Search for Death-Qualified Jurors, 62 TEX. L. REV. 977, 980
1989]
Catholic University Law Review
juries existed as early as 1820.43 Both courts and legislatures" have since
considered the issue of whether potential jurors' personal beliefs about capi-
tal punishment can properly serve as a basis for excluding them from jury
service. Many state rules or statutes authorize the exclusion of jurors whose
views on the death penalty would in some way interfere with their ability to
be impartial.4" The lack of impartiality sufficient to justify exclusion of a
prospective juror could be one of two possible types. A juror could be ex-
cluded if his awareness that the death penalty could be imposed if the de-
fendant were convicted would affect his determination on the issue of guilt.4 6
He could also be excluded if he could decide fairly as to guilt or innocence,
but his views on capital punishment would cause him to be unable to apply
the law at the sentencing stage.4 7 Although both supporters and opponents
of the death penalty could theoretically be excluded from jury service based
on their beliefs regarding capital punishment, the jurors opposed to the
death penalty are more frequently excluded."
In its 1892 decision in Logan v. United States, the Supreme Court ex-
pressly approved the practice of death-qualifying juries in federal courts,
(1984) (the prosecution successfully challenged for cause jurors who could not be excluded
under Witherspoon); White, Death Qualified Juries: The "Prosecution-Proneness" Argument
Reexamined, 41 U. PiTT. L. REV. 353, 354 (1980) (excluding all those who stated they would
automatically refuse to impose the death penalty); Comment, Constitutional Law: Does
"Death Qualification " Spell Death for the Capital Defendant's Right to an Impartial Jury 26
WASHBURN L.J. 3842, 382 (1987) (excluding prospective jurors who are unalterably opposed to
the death penalty).
43. Comment, supra note 42, at 383-84 & n.17.
44. Many states have enacted statutes authorizing exclusions for cause based on jurors'
views on the death penalty. See infra note 45. Courts have then attempted to decide whether
the statutory schemes are constitutional.
45. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-152 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-33-304 (1987); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1074.8 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.13 (West 1985); IDAHO CODE
§ 19-2020-9 (1987); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 798(2) (West 1981); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 546.130 (1987); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1212(8) (1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.25(c) (Anderson 1987); TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 35.13, 35.16(b)(1) (Vernon 1988). The Supreme Court has declared
some of these statutes unconstitutional. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.3 1(b) (Vernon
1974) (cited in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 43 (1980)). However, the Oklahoma case law
requiring defendants to use a peremptory challenge if a trial judge erroneously fails to excuse a
juror through a challenge for cause was left in place by the Court. See infra notes 178-203 and
accompanying text,
46. See Comment, supra note 26 at 1188 n.8 (listing several such statutes); Oberer, Does
Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punishment Constitute Denial of Fair
Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEX. L. REV. 545, 550 n.25 (1961) (citing N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC.
§ 377 and Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1099,
1106 (1953)).
47. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 n.21 (1968) (discussing both
types of impartiality); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1980) (same).
48. Comment, supra note 26, at 1188.
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noting that every court which had addressed the issue at that time had ac-
cepted it.4 9 The practice of death-qualifying juries under Logan continued
virtually unchanged for more than half a century.
B. Witherspoon v. Illinois
Death-qualification became an issue again in 1968, when the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the case of Witherspoon v. Illinois5" to decide
whether the Constitution permitted a state to execute a man based on the
verdict returned by a death-qualified jury.5' Witherspoon had been con-
victed of murder and sentenced to death.5 2 Pursuant to an Illinois statute,
the trial judge excluded every person who stated during voir dire that he was
opposed to capital punishment or had conscientious "scruples" against it.53
Witherspoon contended that a state could not give a jury selected in such a
manner the power to determine guilt.54 He offered three statistical studies in
support of the proposition that death-qualified juries were biased in favor of
the prosecution.
55
Despite the proffered statistics, the Supreme Court found that Wither-
spoon had not conclusively proven that a jury assembled through the use of
death-qualification was predisposed toward conviction. 6 However, the
Court did accept Witherspoon's argument that a jury constituted in such a
manner was predisposed to impose the death penalty. 57
The Court pointed out that Witherspoon was not a case in which jurors
49. 144 U.S. 263, 298 (1892).
50. 389 U.S. 1035 (1968).
51. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 513 (1968).
52. Id. at 512.
53. Id. at 514-15. At the time of Witherspoon's trial, the pertinent statute provided: "[i]n
trials for murder it shall be a cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined,
state that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the
same." Id. at 512 & n.l (citing ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, § 743 (1959)). The term "scruples" had
become a term of art used in death-qualification cases since Logan, 144 U.S. at 298. It is
generally used to mean objections, concerns, or reservations about capital punishment that fall
short of total opposition to it.
54. 391 U.S. at 516.
55. Id. at 517 & n.10. The complete studies were not even submitted to the Court. One of
them, by H. Zeisel, was not yet published, but a preliminary summary of the results was cited
in the petition for writ of certiorari. Id. at 517 n.10. Two others, one by W.C. Wilson, Ph.D.,
and the other by F.J. Goldberg, D.Ed., were cited in the Petitioner's Brief. Id. For more
detail on the social science studies, see Comment, supra note 42, at 384 n.25.
56. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517-18. The Court did not say that Witherspoon's argument
could never succeed, but only that the data he had introduced in this case were too tentative to
establish firmly the proposition at that time. Id. For a later discussion which finds statistical
studies demonstrating conviction-prone juries to be much more credible, see the dissent in
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 187-92 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521.
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were excluded if they indicated that their views against the death penalty
would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to guilt, nor a case
where jurors were excused if they indicated that they could never impose
capital punishment." The Court noted that at Witherspoon's trial, thirty-
nine prospective jurors had been excluded for merely expressing some con-
scientious or religious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty,
although they had never been asked whether they would be able to apply the
law impartially regardless of those views. 9 The Witherspoon Court dis-
missed its own earlier acceptance of the death-qualification practice in Logan
as dicta,6° and concluded that where all persons opposed to the death pen-
alty or having scruples concerning it had been eliminated from the panel, the
jury could not adequately represent the community's views on the ultimate
question of life or death.6 ' Just as a state cannot let a jury "organized to
convict" determine guilt or innocence, it cannot permit a jury "organized to
return a verdict of death" to make the decision of whether to impose the
death penalty.6 2 Therefore, although the Court did not reverse Wither-
spoon's conviction, it did overturn his death sentence.6 3
The most significant legacy of Witherspoon arose from a footnote in the
decision. The Court asserted that a state could execute a defendant who was
sentenced to death by a jury from which the only venirepersons excluded for
cause were those who expressed an unmistakable intention to vote automati-
cally against the death penalty regardless of the evidence, or who stated that
their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from being im-
partial on the issue of guilt.64
The Witherspoon Court identified a two part test for exclusion of jurors.
As a threshold question, the first part of the test required the judge to decide
whether a juror's views on the death penalty would lead to one of two possi-
ble results: the juror would automatically vote against the death penalty, or
58. Id. at 513-14.
59. Id. at 514-15.
60. Id. at 523 n.22.
61. Id. at 519-20.
62. Id. at 521.
63. Id. at 522-23.
64. Id. at 522 n.21. The exact language appearing in the Witherspoon footnote has been
extensively quoted in subsequent decisions and in the literature. The language stated that the
court could exclude for cause only those venirepersons
who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the
imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be devel-
oped at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death




the juror would not be impartial as to guilt.65 If either of those results could
occur, the second part of the Witherspoon test established the level of proof
necessary for a judge to exclude a venireperson. The Witherspoon Court
stated that jurors could be excluded only if they made it unmistakably clear
that their death penalty views would lead to one of the two possible results
set forth above.6 6
C. Responses to Witherspoon - Other Approaches to Death-Qualification
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Witherspoon, which appeared
to identify circumstances in which death-qualification of jurors would be
permitted, defendants in capital cases mounted challenges to death-qualified
juries in the lower courts on other grounds. In the late 1970's and early
1980's, state courts,6 7 federal circuit courts of appeal,6 8 and the United
States Supreme Court6 9 continued the effort to define the circumstances in
which a death-qualified jury was constitutionally permissible.
1. The Conviction-Prone Argument
In one case, United States ex rel. Clarke v. Fike,70 the defendant appealed
his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
advancing an argument similar to that which Witherspoon had presented
earlier. 7' He alleged that a death-qualified jury was biased in favor of the
prosecution and was therefore "conviction-prone. ' 72  That defendant
presented several social science studies in support of his claim which were
similar to those that had been submitted in Witherspoon, but like Wither-
spoon, failed to persuade the court to reverse his conviction on these
grounds.73 The Supreme Court indicated its unwillingness to change its po-
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), rev'd, 448 U.S. 38
(1980); Davis v. State, 236 Ga. 804, 225 S.E.2d 241 (1976), rev'd, 429 U.S. 122 (1976).
68. See, e.g., Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153
(1986); Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982);
Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979);
United States ex rel. Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1064
(1977).
69. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976).
70. 538 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 761.
73. Id. at 762. The petitioner submitted three new studies. One was a Harris poll, and
one rehashed data from an earlier study. The Court discounted both studies. 1d. The third
study the court considered was based on the responses of a small group of people who were
asked hypothetical questions. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit characterized
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sition on this issue by refusing to grant certiorari. 4 By refusing to take a
case advancing arguments similar to Witherspoon's, the Court forced capital
defendants to formulate alternative challenges to the death-qualification
practice.
2. The Representative Cross-Section Argument
In Taylor v. Louisiana,5 the Supreme Court recognized that the Ameri-
can jury trial concept contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of
the community, and invalidated a jury selection statute that effectively elimi-
nated women from jury venires. 6 In 1976, the Court decided the case of
Davis v. Georgia,77 in which a fair cross-section claim was made against a
death-qualified jury. Davis had been convicted of murder and sentenced to
death by a jury from which one member had been improperly excluded
under the Witherspoon standard. 78 The Supreme Court of Georgia acknowl-
edged that the juror had been erroneously excluded,79 but nevertheless af-
firmed the conviction on the ground that the defendant failed to demonstrate
systematic exclusion of a group of jurors representing a cross-section of the
community." On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that the representative cross-section inquiry was not the test established
in Witherspoon."l The Court reiterated the Witherspoon rule: If a venireper-
son had been improperly excluded for cause, any subsequently imposed
death penalty could not stand.8 2
Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the Witherspoon test did not
necessarily lead to the result the majority reached.8 3 He attacked the deci-
sion on two grounds. First, he suggested that Witherspoon did not require
the study as not increasing empirical evidence sufficiently on the "conviction prone" issue to
overcome the Supreme Court's objection to existing data as "fragmentary and tentative." Id.
74. 429 U.S. at 1064.
75. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The Court later made the same finding with regard to a slightly
different statutory scheme in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365-70 (1979).
76. 419 U.S. at 538. The Louisiana statute overturned in Taylor excluded all women
from jury service unless a particular woman indicated her desire to participate. Id. at 523.
The Missouri statute invalidated in Duren automatically excused women from jury service if
they either mailed in a card requesting an exemption or simply failed to appear on the sched-
uled date. Duren, 439 U.S. at 362.
77. 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam).
78. Id. at 122. The juror in question was excluded even though her objections to the
death penalty were not strong enough to fulfill Witherspoon's "unmistakably clear" standard.
Davis v. State, 236 Ga. 804, 225 S.E.2d 241, 243-44 (1976), rev'd, 429 U.S. 122 (1976).
79. 429 U.S. at 122.
80. Id. at 122-23 (quoting Davis v. State, 236 Ga. at 809-10, 225 S.E.2d at 244-45).
81. 429 U.S. at 123.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 123 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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per se reversal when only one juror was improperly excluded.84 He asserted
that in such a case, the Court should have considered the harmless error test
established in Chapman v. California. " Justice Rehnquist believed that if
Davis' conviction and sentencing were submitted to harmless error review,
no reversal would be required.8 6 Second, he argued that it was not totally
clear that the juror in question had been improperly excluded under Wither-
spoon. 7 The problem, according to Justice Rehnquist, was that the juror
had not been questioned sufficiently to make a determination as to *hether
she could be excluded.88
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Davis represents the first assertion of the
utility of the harmless error test in conjunction with the Witherspoon stan-
dard in a death-qualification case. Nevertheless, the majority rejected Jus-
tice Rehnquist's position and ruled the representative cross-section test
inapplicable in the death-qualification context.8 9 However, Davis was not
the end of the fair cross-section attack on death-qualified juries.
In the late 1970's, two circuit courts of appeal also considered allegations
of sixth amendment violations based on prior Supreme Court decisions re-
quiring jury venires to be composed of a fair cross-section of the community.
In Spinkellink v. Wainwright,90 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit considered a claim that the practice of death-qualifying juries
violated a defendant's sixth amendment right to a trial by a jury consisting of
a fair cross-section of the community. The court ruled that even if the
death-qualification process violated the fair cross-section requirement, the
state's overriding interest in having a single jury decide on both guilt and
sentencing in capital cases justified any such violation. 9'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered a
similar fair cross-section claim in Keeten v. Garrison. 92 Unlike the Fifth Cir-
84. Id. at 123-24.
85. Id. (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). The Chapman rule articulates
that a federal constitutional error cannot be held harmless unless the court declares a belief
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 386 U.S. at 24. The Court stated that its goal
was the same as in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963), where the beneficiary of a consti-
tutional error would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24.
86. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. at 124 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id. Justice Rehnquist suggested in his dissent that a hearing could still be held to
question the excluded juror in order to determine whether or not she was really excludable for
cause. Id.
89. 429 U.S. at 123.
90. 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979).
91. Id. at 597.
92. 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986).
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cuit, the Keeten court found no possible sixth amendment violation in the
exclusion of jurors opposed to the death penalty.9 3 Specifically, the court
determined that death penalty opponents were not a distinct community
group. 94 The court further found that the state's interest in seating a compe-
tent, impartial jury took precedence over the defendant's right to be tried by
a non-death-qualified jury.9" Once again, criminal defendants were unsuc-
cessful in abolishing the practice of death-qualifying juries. A new approach
was still needed.
3. The Detrimental Effects Argument
Just a few years after its decision in Spinkellink,96 the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, in Smith v. Balkcom, considered a case in which the
defendant claimed that the death-qualification of jurors should be found un-
constitutional because it had serious detrimental effects on a jury.97 This
claim was based on the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Ballew v. Geor-
gia. 98 Ballew concerned the constitutionality of a statute permitting five-
person juries in criminal cases.9 9 The Court held that five-person juries vio-
lated the defendant's right to a trial by jury because of the detrimental effects
of a reduction in the number of jurors."° The Fifth Circuit rejected the
defendant's detrimental effects claim, reasoning that Ballew merely set a
minimum for jury size and did not find that any combination of factors detri-
mental to jury functions could constitute a sixth amendment violation.''
This same argument concerning violation of the right to a trial by jury has
consistently failed in other federal courts as well as state courts.10 2
The various arguments that these defendants offered in support of their
quest for reversal of death penalty convictions met with inconsistent results
in both state courts and federal circuit courts. Because the Supreme Court
93. Id.
94. Id. at 133 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596-97 (1978); Adams v. Texas, 448
U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
95. 742 F.2d at 134.
96. 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979). See infra notes 90-91
and accompanying text.
97. 660 F.2d 573, 583 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
98. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
99. Id. at 224.
100. Id. at 239. The specific detrimental effects the Court recognized were that smaller
juries: led to inaccurate fact finding, id. at 232; resulted in a jury less representative of the
community by tending to exclude minorities, id. at 236-38; failed to provide adequately for the
counterbalancing of individual biases, id. at 233-34; and tended to produce inaccurate and
inconsistent verdicts, id. at 234-35. See generally, Comment, supra note 42, at 390-91.
101. 660 F.2d at 584.
102. Comment, supra note 42, at 392 & n.68.
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denied certiorari in most of these cases, no clear national standard emerged
concerning the practice of death-qualifying jurors.
III. THE SUPREME COURT RETURNS TO DEATH-QUALIFICATION CASES
- A SEARCH FOR STANDARDS IN THE 1980's
In the 1980's, the Supreme Court considered several death-qualification
cases."°3 Although they generally followed from the Witherspoon decision, a
clearly articulable standard on the issue of excluding jurors because of their
views on capital punishment still did not emerge.' °4
A. Adams v. Texas
In Adams v. Texas,'0 5 the defendant sought reversal of his murder convic-
tion and death sentence based on an inconsistency between a Texas statute
and the Witherspoon standard. 10 6 At the time of Adams' trial, the Texas
jury selection scheme in capital cases used only one jury in a bifurcated pro-
ceeding, where guilt was determined first, and sentencing pursued in a sepa-
rate phase. 10 7  The Texas statute required the trial judge to advise
prospective jurors that if convicted, the defendant would be sentenced to
either life imprisonment or death.'0 8 The jurors were then required to take
an oath that the possibility of the death penalty would not affect their delib-
erations on the facts. 109 Adams argued that jurors who had refused to take
the oath and therefore had been excluded from jury service pursuant to the
statute, could not have been excluded under the Witherspoon rule. " 0
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Adams to decide two ques-
tions."' The first was whether the Witherspoon rule applied to bifurcated
trials." 2 The Court held that it did.' 13 The second was whether the exclu-
103. See infra notes 105-49 and accompanying text.
104. Id.
105. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
106. Id. at 42-43.
107. Id. at 40-41.
108. Id. at 43. The Court referred to TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.3 1(b) (Vernon 1974)
which provided:
[p]rospective jurors shall be informed that a sentence of life imprisonment or death is
mandatory on conviction of a capital felony. A prospective juror shall be disqualified
from serving as a juror unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of
death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.
Id.
109. 448 U.S. at 42.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 43.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 45. The Texas statute provided that following a verdict of guilty, a sentencing
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sion of jurors that had occurred in this case, consistent with the Texas stat-
ute, violated Witherspoon. 114 Because the Texas statute required the
exclusion of jurors on broader grounds than those Witherspoon permitted,
the Adams Court found, with reference to the second issue, that several ju-
rors had been impermissibly excluded. 15 However, the Adams Court, ap-
parently attempting to restate the Witherspoon rule, actually articulated a
different standard.
Witherspoon had not permitted exclusion of jurors unless they made it
unmistakably clear that either they would automatically vote against the
death penalty regardless of the evidence, or that their attitudes about the
death penalty would prevent them from being impartial as to guilt.'" 6 How-
ever, the Adams Court referred to Witherspoon and the line of cases follow-
ing it as standing for the proposition that a juror could not be challenged for
cause unless his views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially
impair the performance of his duties as a juror.' 17
The Witherspoon language about "automatically vot[ing] against the death
penalty"" 8 is quite different from the Adams "prevent or substantially im-
pair" standard." 9 Without apparently meaning to do so, the Adams Court
misstated the actual standard for exclusion that Witherspoon had estab-
lished, and did not address the issue of the quantum of proof necessary to
exclude at all.' 20 The Adams decision generated confusion as to whether the
Court intended the "unmistakably clear" part of the Witherspoon test to re-
main viable. Consequently, divergent views emerged regarding the proper
meaning of Witherspoon after the Adams decision.121
proceeding occurs. Evidence can then be introduced regarding mitigating or aggravating cir-
cumstances. The jury must then answer three specific statutory questions. The judge is re-
quired to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment based strictly on the jury's answers
to the questions. Id. at 40-41. The Adams Court found that this procedure made the jury's
role more limited than under the Illinois statute, but that the Witherspoon rule nevertheless
applied. Id. at 46-47 & n.4.
114. Id. at 43. See also id., n.2 regarding the Fifth Circuit's ruling concerning the same
statute.
115. Id. at 48-50.
116. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21.
117. 448 U.S. at 45.
118. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
119. 448 U.S. at 45.
120. For another interpretation of what occurred in Adams, see Comment, supra note 26,
at 1195.
121. See, e.g., Briley v. Bass, 750 F.2d 1238, 1246 (4th Cir. 1984) (applying Witherspoon
only and not mentioning Adams), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1088 (1985); Monroe v. Blackburn,
748 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1984) (same), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1145 (1986); Green v. Zant,
738 F.2d 1529, 1534 (1 Ith Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098 (1984); Willie v. Maggio,
737 F.2d 1372, 1388 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984); Turner v. Bass, 753
F.2d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 1985) (relying on Witherspoon and Adams, but not applying the
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B. Wainwright v. Witt
The Supreme Court recognized that confusion as to the proper application
of Witherspoon existed in the lower courts, and therefore granted certiorari
in the case of Wainwright v. Witt. 122 Following his conviction for first de-
gree murder and imposition of the death sentence, Witt alleged Witherspoon
violations in the selection of the jury that convicted him.'23 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had applied the test from
the Witherspoon footnote,"' and found that the excluded juror's statements
fell short of what would have been necessary to justify her exclusion. 25
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and upheld Witt's sen-
tence, 126 but based its decision on the standard articulated in Adams rather
than Witherspoon. 127 The Witt Court characterized the famous Witherspoon
footnote as dicta, 121 and stated its rationale for preferring the Adams test to
Witherspoon. 129 The Court pointed out that under the sixth amendment,
"unmistakably clear" standard), rev'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 28 (1986); Milton v.
Procunier, 744 F.2d 1091, 1101-02 (5th Cir. 1984) (frankly discussing the Court's problems
understanding Adams), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030 (1985); Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129,
133 (4th Cir. 1984) (applying Adams, but in a fair cross-section context); Darden v. Wain-
wright, 725 F.2d 1526, 1528-30, 1532 (11th Cir.) (clearly embracing Witherspoon's "unmistak-
ably clear" standard despite passing references to Adams), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1230 (1984);
King v. Strickland, 714 F.2d 1481, 1492 (1lth Cir. 1983) (treating Witherspoon and Adams as
the same; no "unmistakably clear" standard); O'Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir.
1982) (accepting Adams but not applying it), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986); and Jurek v.
Estelle, 623 F.2d 929, 942 (5th Cir. 1980) (accepting Adams and urging lower court to apply it
on remand), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
122. 469 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1985).
123. Id. at 415. Witt was unsuccessful in securing postconviction review in the state
courts. 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980). He then sought habeas
corpus review in the federal courts. Witt argued that three of the jurors excluded for cause by
the trial judge did not meet the Witherspoon standard for exclusion. 469 U.S. at 415 n.1.
124. 714 F.2d 1069, 1080-81 (11th Cir. 1983).
125. Id. at 1081. Although Witt was challenging the validity of the exclusion of three
jurors, the court of appeals focused on the one juror whose answers on voir dire least clearly
demonstrated an inability to follow the law. The Supreme Court agreed with that characteri-
zation, and therefore also focused on the questioning of that one juror. 469 U.S. at 415 n.l.
126. 469 U.S. at 418.
127. Id. at 423-24. The Court stated that it was "reaffirming" Adams and "clarifying"
Witherspoon. Id. at 424.
128. Id. at 422. The Court supported this statement by attempting to distinguish Adams
from Witherspoon. In Witherspoon, the Court was deciding only when prospective jurors
could not be excluded. Therefore, reasoned the Witt Court, any statement discussing when
they could be excluded was not part of the decision. Id. The Court also noted that Illinois law
at the time of the Witherspoon decision gave juries in capital cases unlimited discretion in
sentencing. Id. at 421. Therefore, the Court believed that the need for such a strong standard
for exclusion of jurors did not exist where the jury's discretion was much more limited. Id. at
422.
129. Id. at 421-22.
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challenges for cause were designed to eliminate jurors who could not be im-
partial.' 3 ° The defendant was guaranteed no more in capital cases.13 '
The Witt Court apparently viewed the Adams test as preferable because it
would eliminate those jurors whose views on capital punishment would pre-
vent them from being impartial, but also viewed the Witherspoon test as go-
ing too far by slanting the jury in favor of the defendant.' 32 The Court also
noted with approval the Adams Court's rejection of the "unmistakably
clear" standard of proof. 13  Although the second part of the Witherspoon
test, the application of the "unmistakably clear" standard, appeared to be
dead after Wainwright v. Witt, no clear rule on death-qualification had devel-
oped to take its place.
C. Lockhart v. McCree
The Supreme Court examined the death-qualification issue from yet an-
other perspective in the case of Lockhart v. McCree. 13' The Court had pre-
viously established the requirement that jury venires must be drawn from a
fair cross-section of the community, 135 and both state and the federal courts
had considered fair cross-section challenges to the death-qualification of ju-
ries with varying results.136 In Lockhart, the Supreme Court again consid-
ered a claim that death-qualification violated the fair cross-section
requirement.' 37 McCree had been convicted and sentenced to life imprison-
ment for felony murder by a jury from which those who stated that they
could never vote for imposition of the death penalty had been excluded pur-
suant to Witherspoon. 138 McCree appealed his conviction on the grounds
that the death-qualification process deprived him of an impartial jury be-
cause the exclusion of death penalty opponents produced a jury that did not
represent a fair cross-section of the community. 139 The Supreme Court held
first that the fair cross-section requirement did not apply to petit juries, but
130. Id. at 423.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 424-25.
134. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
135. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
136. Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986);
Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979);
Davis v. State, 236 Ga. 804, 225 S.E.2d 241 (1976), rev'd, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam).
See, e.g., supra notes 75-95 and accompanying text.
137. 476 U.S. at 167 (1986).
138. Id. at 166.
139. Id. at 167.
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only to venires; 1" and second, that even if the fair cross-section requirement
were extended to petit juries, the death-qualification of jurors would not vio-
late it.' 4 ' The Court's rationale for the second part of its decision was that a
successful fair cross-section claim would require systematic exclusion of a
distinct group in the community, such as blacks, women, or Mexican-Ameri-
cans, and not a group defined only in terms of shared attitudes.'42 The
Lockhart Court also rejected the claim that petitioner's sixth and fourteenth
amendment rights to a trial by jury had been violated, holding that no af-
firmative mix of individual viewpoints had to be represented on a jury.'4 3
Three justices dissented from the decision in Lockhart."' They argued
that excluding jurors pursuant to the "unmistakably clear" language of
Witherspoon gave the prosecution an advantage in cases with the most seri-
ous charges and the most severe penalties possible. '45 The dissent based its
opinion on evidence, which it characterized as overwhelming, that death-
qualified juries were more likely to convict, and to convict of more serious
charges, than were those juries that were not death-qualified.' 46 The dissent
viewed the Adams decision as permitting the Witherspoon test to be used for
the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial.' 4 7 In addition, the dissenting opinion
also referred to the factors identified in Ballew v. Georgia 148 as requiring
reversal of the conviction, and stated that the same negative effects resulting
from five-member juries were not only present, but magnified by the death-
qualification process. 149 Apparently, at the time of the Lockhart decision,
three justices opposed permitting the death-qualification of jurors on more
than one ground.
140. Id. at 173. The Court characterized an extension of the fair cross-section requirement
to petit juries as unworkable and unsound. Id. at 174.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 175. The reason the Court included this discussion concerning the types of
groups that could bring a fair cross-section claim is unclear. It certainly was not necessary in
light of the case's main holding. Perhaps the Court was availing itself of the opportunity to
discourage, through dicta in the Lockhart case, some anticipated claims from other groups that
might best be defined as having "shared attitudes." Id. at 176.
143. Id. at 178.
144. Id. at 184 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Stevens joined in the
dissent.
145. Id. at 184-85.
146. Id. at 184.
147. Id. at 197. The Lockhart dissent referred to the dissent in Adams, 448 U.S. at 52,
where Justice Rehnquist had pointed out the lack of distinction between the jury's function in
the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial. 476 U.S. at 197.
148. Id. at 198-202. For an enumeration of the detrimental factors identified in Ballew, see
supra note 100 and accompanying text.
149. 476 U.S. at 199.
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IV. JUDICIAL ERROR - HARMLESS OR REVERSIBLE?
After the series of death-qualification cases from Witherspoon through
Lockhart, it appeared that the Adams and Witt standards had emerged as
the basis for the death-qualification exclusion of jurors. This is true even
though many subsequent cases still used the term "Witherspoon exclud-
ables."' 5° The next two death-qualification cases the Supreme Court consid-
ered presented another conflict yet to be resolved. The cases of Gray v.
Mississippi 151 and Ross v. Oklahoma 152 both involved judicial error in chal-
lenges for cause based on the prospective jurors' views on the death penalty.
However, the similarity ends there. These two cases established completely
different tests for reversible error.
A. Gray v. Mississippi
In Davis v. Georgia, the Supreme Court ruled that an improper Wither-
spoon exclusion required reversal of a death penalty sentence.' 53 The issue
presented in Gray v. Mississippi was whether Davis should be abandoned and
an impermissible juror exclusion be given harmless error review. 154  In
Gray's trial, the court refused to exclude at least five jurors for cause who
stated that they could never impose the death penalty,' 5 clearly a violation
of Witherspoon. The prosecutor was forced to use peremptory challenges to
eliminate all such jurors. 15 6
When the next prospective juror, Mrs. Bounds, was called, she expressed
reservations about the death penalty, but said that she could vote for it in
certain cases. "' The prosecutor wanted to use a peremptory challenge
against Mrs. Bounds, but could not because he had no peremptory strikes
remaining. 5 8 He asked the court to grant him another challenge, but that
request was refused.' 59 Instead, the trial court improperly excused Mrs.
Bounds for cause. 60
Gray was ultimately convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to
150. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 167 n. 1 (majority opinion) (discussing the continued use of
this technically inaccurate term).
151. 481 U.S. 648 (1987).
152. 108 S. Ct. 2273 (1988).
153. 429 U.S. at 123. For further discussion of Davis v. Georgia, see supra notes 77-89 and
accompanying text.
154. 481 U.S. at 657.
155. Id. at 651-54.
156. Id. at 652.
157, Id. at 653.
158. Id. at 653-54.
159. Id. at 654-55.
160. Id. at 655, 661-62.
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death.16' The Supreme Court of Mississippi found a violation of state proce-
dures, but reasoned that the trial judge had merely acted to correct his own
error.'6 2 Consequently, the appellate court affirmed both the conviction and
the death sentence. 163 Gray then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
The Court discussed two analyses which might support the argument that
the error in jury selection should be deemed harmless. The first approach,
which appeared to the Supreme Court to have been accepted by the Missis-
sippi court,' 64 would view a state's retention of unexercised peremptory
challenges at the close of jury selection as evidence that even if the trial court
had not removed a venireperson for cause, the state would have done so by
use of a peremptory challenge.165 In this case, the state had no remaining
peremptory challenges to use at the time of the voir dire examination of Mrs.
Bounds.' 6 6 The Mississippi court may have reasoned that the trial judge
recognized his earlier error in failing to exclude some jurors and therefore
restored a peremptory challenge to the prosecution. 167 Then, theoretically,
though Mrs. Bounds was improperly excluded for cause, even if the judge
had not removed her, the prosecutor would have used the restored peremp-
tory challenge to strike her. 168 The second argument, which the State of
Mississippi advanced to the United States Supreme Court, suggested that the
error was an isolated incident without prejudicial effect, because even with-
out Mrs. Bounds, the ultimate panel did fairly represent the community.
69
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments and expressly declined to
adopt a harmless error analysis in this type of case.'17  The Court very
clearly stated that as to the "unexercised peremptory" argument, the critical
question was not whether a juror was excluded due to the trial court's er-
ror.17 1 Instead, the relevant inquiry was whether the trial court's error
could have affected the composition of the jury panel as a whole.' 7 1 Simi-
larly, the argument that the exclusion was a technical error without prejudi-
cial effect was rejected on the grounds that because the Witherspoon/Witt
161. Id. at 656.
162. Id. at 656-57.
163. Id. at 656.
164. Id. at 661.
165. Id. at 660-61.
166. Id. at 653.
167. Id. at 661.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 660-61.
171. Id. at 664-65.
172. Id. at 655 (quoting Moore v. Estelle, 670 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1111 (1982)).
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standard was rooted in a constitutional right to an impartial jury, a harmless
error analysis could not apply. '7 3 The Court stated that some constitutional
rights are so basic to a fair trial that when they are violated, the error can
never be treated as harmless.' 74 On that basis, the Court reversed the Mis-
sissippi judgment as to the imposition of the death penalty.175
Four justices dissented from the majority opinion. 176 The dissent did not
attack the Court's reasoning on the harmless error issue, but argued that the
trial court had properly excluded Mrs. Bounds but had merely articulated
the wrong reason for doing so.
177
B. Ross v. Oklahoma
The Gray decision appeared to establish a clear standard for reversal:
whether the composition of the jury as a whole could have been affected by
the trial court's error. 178 Only one year after deciding Gray v. Mississippi,
however, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in another capital case in-
volving judicial error concerning challenges for cause. 179
The Supreme Court agreed to consider the case of Ross v. Oklahoma be-
cause it involved the defense's use of a peremptory challenge to correct the
trial court's error.'8 ' Ross had been convicted and sentenced to death for
the first degree murder of a police officer. 8 ' At Ross' trial, one prospective
juror had indicated during voir dire questioning that in appropriate circum-
stances, he could recommend a life sentence. 182 However, after further
questioning, he stated that if the defendant were convicted, he would auto-
matically vote to impose the death penalty.' 83 The defense sought to remove
the juror for cause because he had indicated his own inability to follow the
law during the penalty phase of the trial.' 84 However, the trial judge refused
to excuse the juror, and defense counsel was forced to use a peremptory
strike to have him removed. 1
85
173. 481 U.S. at 668.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and
O'Connor joined in the dissent.
177. Id. at 672-78.
178. Id. at 665 (majority opinion). For a more complete discussion of the Gray case and its
holding, see supra notes 151-77 and accompanying text.
179. Ross v. Oklahoma, 482 U.S. 926 (1987).
180. 108 S. Ct. at 2273, 2276 (1988).
181. Id. at 2275-76.






Ross appealed, claiming violations of both the sixth and fourteenth
amendments.18 6 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both
the conviction and the death sentence, stating that there was nothing in the
record to show that any juror who sat was objectionable. 181
Ross advanced both the fourteenth and sixth amendment claims to the
Supreme Court on appeal, but the Court rejected both arguments. 88 In the
majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist set forth the basis for the Court's
decision. First, he announced a standard completely different from that es-
tablished in Gray. Where defense counsel used a peremptory challenge to
remove a juror who should have been excused for cause, any claim of a
violation of the sixth amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury would
now have to focus on the jury that actually sat, and not on the juror who was
excused.' 89 Second, the Court found no sixth amendment violation arising
out of the fact that the defendant was forced to use a peremptory challenge
to correct the trial court's error, because peremptory challenges are not
themselves guaranteed by the Constitution. 90 They are merely a statutory
tool to assist in achieving the goal of an impartial jury."'9 Finally, the Court
found no fourteenth amendment due process violation because Oklahoma
state law required defendants to use their peremptory challenges in just such
instances.' 92
Although the Court acknowledged that the trial judge's ruling was errone-
ous,19 3 and that the failure to remove the juror in question and the defense's
consequential need to exercise a peremptory challenge may have signifi-
cantly changed the ultimate composition of the jury, 19 it did not apply the
Gray test. Instead, the Ross Court interpreted Gray very narrowly, stating
that it applied only in the context of an erroneous Witherspoon exclusion in a
capital case.' 95 Since Ross dealt with a failure to excuse rather than an im-
proper exclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the situation in
Gray could be distinguished, and therefore the Gray standard should not be
applied. 19 6 Furthermore, he characterized the language used in Gray as too
186. Id. at 2275.
187. Id. at 2276 (quoting Ross v. State, 717 P.2d 117, 120 (1986)).
188. 108 S. Ct. at 2277. The case was decided by a 5-4 vote. Justice Marshall wrote a
dissent for the minority which included Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens. Id. at 2280.
For a discussion of the Ross dissent, see infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
189. 108 S. Ct. at 2277.
190. Id. at 2278 (citing Gray v. Mississippi).
191. 108 S. Ct. at 2278-79.
192. Id. at 2279.
193. Id. at 2275, 2277.
194. Id. at 2278.
195. Id.
196. Id. The Court focused on the fact that there was no need to speculate in Ross con-
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broad to be applied literally.197
Justice Marshall wrote a dissent for the four member minority.' 98 He
began by pointing out that a man's life was at stake, and criticized the major-
ity's action as game playing.' 99 He argued that because it was undisputed
that the trial court erred by not striking the juror in question for cause, the
per se resentencing rule enunciated in Gray required Ross' death sentence to
be vacated. 2" The dissent further asserted that even though Oklahoma case
law required the defense to use a peremptory challenge in just such situa-
tions,211 that law impermissibly burdened a defendant's sixth amendment
right to a trial by an impartial jury by requiring the defendant to forfeit one
of his peremptory challenges vis-a-vis the prosecution.20 2 Accordingly, Jus-
tice Marshall argued that the Supreme Court should have invalidated
Oklahoma's common law rule just as it had overturned statutory schemes in
other cases where it found undue burdens on defendants' constitutional
rights.2 °3
The majority's complete departure in Ross from the test developed for a
similar situation in Gray leaves an unanswered question as to the correct
standard courts should apply in death-qualification cases.
C. Gray or Ross - Can an Error in Jury Selection Ever Be Harmless?
Quite clearly, the Gray and Ross decisions arose from very similar factual
circumstances. Although the Gray decision involved a juror who was re-
moved for cause, and Ross involved an erroneous failure to exclude, both
Gray and Ross are cases in which the trial judge failed to apply properly the
cerning whether the juror would have been removed by peremptory challenge, because he was
in fact eliminated through the use of a challenge. However, the Court did not explain the
genesis of its concern with certainty, nor its abandonment of the test it enunciated in Gray.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 2280 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens joined
in the dissent.
199. Id. at 2280.
200. Id.
201. The requirement comes from case law rather than statute. It provides that the failure
to excuse a juror for cause cannot be the basis for appeal unless all peremptories were used and
the defendant was left with an incompetent juror. Id. at 2279 (citing Stett v. State, 538 P.2d
1061, 1064-65 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978); Ferrell v. State, 475 P.2d 825, 828 (Okla. Crim. App.
1970)). The Ross majority quoted McDonald v. State, 54 Okla. Crim. 161, 164-65, as follows:
[i]f counsel believes any juror was pledged to return a verdict imposing the death
penalty, under the circumstances named, he should have purged the jury by chal-
lenge. He cannot speculate on the result of the jury's verdict by consenting that the
juror sit on the panel, and, if the verdict is adverse, then assert he is disqualified.
108 S. Ct. at 2279.
202. 108 S. Ct. at 2282-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 2283.
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Witherspoon/Witt standard.2°" In Gray, the trial court removed a juror for
cause even though she stated her ability to follow the law and apply the
death penalty if appropiate, despite her own personal reservations about cap-
ital punishment.2" 5 The Court stated that the test for reversal in the case of
such error was whether the composition of the jury as a whole could possibly
have been affected by the error.20 6 In Ross, conversely, the Court rejected
the inquiry that it had identified in Gray and announced a new position.
According to Ross, any challenge as to whether the impartial jury require-
ment was met must focus not on the error committed at trial (harmless or
otherwise) but rather on the jury that was actually empaneled and that con-
victed the defendant.20 7
It is true that the Constitution guarantees all criminal defendants the right
to a trial by an impartial jury.20 8 Two devices which help to secure that
right are the challenge for cause and the peremptory challenge.20 9 There
was no question in either Gray or Ross concerning whether the trial court
erred in ruling on the challenges for cause.210 In both cases, the error was
admitted. The focus of the Supreme Court's inquiry was necessarily on the
proper remedy - either automatic reversal or mere harmless error review.
The harmless error test the Court affirmed in Chapman v. California211
described the standard necessary for reversal as whether there is a reason-
able possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to
the conviction.21 2 The party who benefited from a constitutional error
would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of
did not contribute to the verdict obtained.21 3 When compared with the two
part test of Chapman, the Gray decision seems more defensible. A Chap-
man-type harmless error test would require the state to prove that the im-
proper inclusion or exclusion of a juror did not contribute to the verdict.2" 4
The test in Gray requires reversal unless the state can prove that the trial
court's error did not affect the jury composition as a whole.2 15 That test,
which considers whether the jury as a whole was affected, is much closer to
204. See supra notes 159-60, 184-85 and accompanying text.
205. Gray, 481 U.S. at 653.
206. Id. at 665 (quoting Moore v. Estelle, 670 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1111 (1982)).
207. Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2277.
208. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
209. See supra notes 22-41 and accompanying text.
210. Gray, 481 U.S. at 651, 661; Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2276.
211. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
212. Id. at 23; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
213. 386 U.S. at 24.
214. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
215. 481 U.S. at 665.
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the Chapman rule than is ignoring the selection process and examining only
the jury that was empaneled, as required by the rule enunciated in Ross.
The test the Ross majority established is actually only a harmless error test
called by another name. It only permits consideration of the members of the
jury ultimately empaneled. That inquiry does not go as far as the Chapman
harmless error test that Justice Rehnquist advocated in his Davis dissent.2 16
Perhaps the Ross majority thought it was returning to that earlier test.
However, Chapman requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict.2 17 It is impossible to predict
which prospective juror might have been empaneled instead of a juror
wrongly included, much less how he might have voted. Similarly, it is im-
possible to know how an improperly excluded juror might have voted had he
remained on the panel. For these reasons, the Chapman test could never
lead to a finding of harmless error in the context of jury selection because
there are far too many variables to allow proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that the verdict of a differently composed jury would have been the same.
Furthermore, Ross is not generally in agreement with decisions establish-
ing the validity and importance of peremptory challenges. Although it is
well established that peremptory challenges are neither authorized by nor
protected under the Constitution,2 1 8 they are nevertheless one of the most
necessary elements of the trial by jury.2 19 Where a certain number of strikes
are provided to a defendant by statute, as they were in Ross, they cannot be
taken away arbitrarily. If courts permitted such a practice, maintaining
their availability would be pointless. As Justice Marshall pointed out in his
dissent, that is exactly what happened in Ross. 220 While it is true that the
statute in question provided Ross with nine peremptory challenges, and he
was able to use all nine, he was nevertheless compelled to use one of them to
cure an error of the trial court.
Presumably, under the Ross rationale, if the defendant was forced to use
all nine of his peremptory strikes to cure a trial court's continuing errors, he
would have no remedy. He would only be guaranteed the right to use a fixed
number of challenges. He would no longer be guaranteed the right to use
them at his discretion. A trial court could force a litigant to use one or
more, perhaps even all, of his limited number of peremptory challenges to
216. 429 U.S. 122, 124 (1987).
217. 386 U.S. at 23-24.
218. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219
(1965); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583 (1919).
219. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S.
370, 376 (1892).
220. Ross, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 2280 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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secure a right provided to him both by statute and under the common law.
The implication of the rule created in Ross is that the peremptory challenge
would be effectively eliminated. The Gray decision is preferable to Ross be-
cause it avoids a result that would conflict with the Supreme Court's demon-
strated commitment to retaining the peremptory challenge.2 2" '
The majority in Ross did not convincingly distinguish the case from Gray,
nor did it advance a persuasive rationale for completely departing from its
prior rule. The real reason for the shift in standards between the Gray and
Ross decisions appears to be the shift in the composition of the Court. Jus-
tice Powell agreed with the plurality that decided Gray on all issues except
one.222 By the time Ross was decided, Justice Kennedy had replaced Justice
Powell on the bench, and joined the four dissenters from Gray. 223 Similarly,
the plurality from Gray became the dissenters in Ross. 224 It is this change in
the composition of the Court, rather than a change in legal reasoning, that
best explains the Court's sudden shift of position.
V. CONCLUSION
The Constitution provides criminal defendants the right to trial by an im-
partial jury and a guarantee of due process under the law. In seeking to
protect these rights, the Supreme Court has identified, albeit inconsistently,
several activities that are not permitted. The goal of Witherspoon and its
progeny was to secure impartial juries for defendants in capital cases. The
early death-qualification cases examined the process by which jurors could
be excluded. Similarly, the decision in Gray required an examination of the
process employed in a criminal trial in order to decide whether constitu-
tional violations occurred. In Ross, the Court conversely held that the pro-
cess does not matter as long as the desired result is achieved.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court should review its decisions in death-
qualification cases and reconsider its reasons for limiting the practice of
death-qualification. The Court should recognize that the Gray decision is
more consistent with the protection it has traditionally afforded to the con-
stitutional rights of defendants in capital cases. The Court should not over-
look the reason that the two types of challenges were initially created, and
should not leave defendants in a position that requires them to surrender
221. See supra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
222. He disagreed with the plurality's criticism of the prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges to excuse jurors who expressed hesitation about the death penalty. 481 U.S. at 670
(Powell, J., concurring).
223. 108 S. Ct. at 2275.
224. Id. at 2280 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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their statutory rights to ensure receipt of the protections guaranteed to them
under the Constitution.
Karen T. Grisez
